Aid versus sanctions for taming oppressors: theory and case study of the Iraqi Kurds

We model an oppressor aiming at victimizing an excluded group in his country, with two main variants. A foreign power affects his behaviour using either conditional aid, subject to the dictator’s participation constraint, or the threat of sanctions, broadly defined, subject to the credibility constraint. The choice between the two is either determined by the latter, or by their relative cost. Aid is preferred when the threat of sanctions is ineffective, and sanctions are too expensive. Sanctions might be imposed, if the threat is ineffective. A case study of the Iraqi Kurds after Iraq was subject to sanctions is presented.     

TERRORISM: FACTS FROM FIGURES 1

If international terrorism is on a rising trend, an important source of confirmation or refutation of this is time‐series data on terrorist activity. Using chiefly data collected by the RAND/MIPT consortium we show using basic statistical analysis that in the period 1968–2005 the yearly number of all international terrorist incidents shows no trend over time, but fluctuates year on year in a random manner. On the other hand some indicators do show a definite trend over time, principally the steady rise in the number of incidents that are death‐dealing in nature. A further conclusion is drawn, showing that the proportion of these incidents leading to deaths above a given level is virtually fixed.     

ON THE CHOICE OF MULTI-TASK R&D DEFENSE PROJECTS: A CASE STUDY OF The ISRAELI MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Investments in R&D constitute a major share of the expenditures of the hi-tech industry since, generally, they enable firms to successfully compete in the rapidly and constantly changing markets for hi-tech products and services. The role of R&D projects is particularly important in the areas of defense and homeland security due to the nature of warfare and the continuous threats posed by arms races and by terror organizations. This study analyzes the choice of the R&D projects designed to counter multiple related military threats. It develops the methodology required to assess whether it is preferable to develop one project to thwart several related threats, or several distinct projects, each of which provides an answer to one specific threat or a partial set of the threats. An analytic solution is provided and assessed for two simple models with two related threats. A solution of the model is then provided for any number of related threats, using a dynamic programming methodology. Finally, we demonstrate the usefulness of our model and methodology to Israel’s missile defense problem; that is, we show how to optimally develop systems aimed at thwarting the multiple threats of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles.     

THE FATE OF DISPUTED TERRITORIES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper presents a simple model to characterize the outcome of a land dispute between two rival parties using a Stackelberg game. Unlike Gershenson and Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]), we assume that the opposing parties have access to different technologies for challenging and defending in conflict. We derive the conditions under which territorial conflict between the two parties is less likely to persist indefinitely. Allowing for an exogenous destruction term as in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000 Garfinkel, M. and Skaperdas, S. 2000. Conflict without misperceptions or incomplete information: how the future matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 793–807. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), we show that, when the nature of conflict becomes more destructive, the likelihood of a peaceful outcome, in which the territory’s initial possessor deters the challenging party, increases if the initial possessor holds more intrinsic value for the disputed land. Following Siqueira (2003 Siqueira, K. 2003. Conflict and third‐party intervention. Defence and Peace Economics, 14(6): 389–400. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]), our model has policy implications for peace through third‐party intervention.     

A ‘transparent gold’ rush?

Abstract

The signing of a new treaty on the equitable sharing of the Nile waters – signed last May in Kampala by Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania – has the potential of derailing relations with Sudan and Egypt. According to the latter countries, this new agreement replaces the 1959 Nile agreement – that awarded them with 90 per cent control over the Nile water – giving other Nile Basin countries the possibility to implement water-related projects in agriculture and energy. This new development, according to Egypt and Sudan, places their water level security in jeopardy. Furthermore, the use of land grabs and water consumption for food security by wealthy foreign countries contributes to the sensitive situation the nine Nile Basin countries are now facing. Water is a red line when it comes to Egypt and Sudan and the future of the whole region depends on whether this line will be crossed.     

Book reviews

Frank Zimmer, Bismarcks Kampf gegen Kaiser Franz Joseph Konigsgratz und seine Folgen. Graz, Vienna, Cologne: Styria Verlag 1996. Pp.203,49 illus., 1 map. OS 350/DM 49. ISBN 3–222–12377–2.

Saul Zadka, Blood in Zion: How the Jewish Guerrillas drove the British out of Palestine. London and Washington: Brassey's, 1995. Pp.227, chron., illus., index. £19.95. ISBN 1–85753–136–1.

Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water's Edge: Defending against the Modern Amphibious Assault. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996. Pp.xvi+217, notes, biblio, index. $36.95. ISBN 1–55750–308–7.

Max G. Manwaring and William J. Olson (eds.) Managing Contemporary Conflict: Pillars of Success. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996. Pp.269, no index. $65 (cloth); $25 (paper). ISBN 0–8133–8969 and 9978–5

Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions, Carlisle Barracks, PA: The

Richard L. Millett and Michael Gold‐Biss (eds.) Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition. University of Miami: North/South Center Press; Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp.xv +317, index. $24.95. ISBN 1–5745–000–9.

Rudolph C. Barnes Jr, Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996. Pp.199, select biblio., index. £27.50/$39.50, ISBN 0–714–4624–5.     

Joint inventory and pricing decisions for perishable products with two‐period lifetime

We consider a periodic review model over a finite horizon for a perishable product with fixed lifetime equal to two review periods. The excess demand in a period is backlogged. The optimal replenishment and demand management (using price) decisions for such a product depend on the relative order of consumption of fresh and old units. We obtain insights on the structure of these decisions when the order of consumption is first‐in, first‐out and last‐in, first‐out. For the FIFO system, we also obtain bounds on both the optimal replenishment quantity as well as expected demand. We compare the FIFO system to two widely analyzed inventory systems that correspond to nonperishable and one‐period lifetime products to understand if demand management would modify our understanding of the relationship among the three systems. In a counterintuitive result, we find that it is more likely that bigger orders are placed in the FIFO system than for a nonperishable product when demand is managed. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013